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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
A shareholder may bring a direct action against investment bank-
ers for giving negligent advice in a sale of control transaction
In recent years, the role of investment bankers in corporate
decision making has increased dramatically.' In the context of any
major corporate control transaction, an investment banker's fair-
ness opinion2 is a regular and indispensable component.' In theory,
' Note, Investment Bankers' Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions, 96
YALE L.J. 119, 121-22 (1986). This increase is largely attributable to the "heightened level of
merger and acquisition activity." Id. at 121. In addition to the increasing number of transac-
tions, the size and complexity of each deal has made investment banker participation an
indispensible component. See id. at 121 n.15 (from 1975 to 1985, value of transactions in-
creased from $14 billion to $180 billion and number of $100 million deals rose from 14 to
270).
The major factor behind the rising level of mergers and acquisitions has been the
growth of leveraged buyouts, financed through high-yield junk bonds. See Oesterle & Nor-
berg, Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 207, 208 (1988). The use of junk bonds became popular to many institutional investors
willing to take positions in highly leveraged companies because "deregulation ha[d] permit-
ted new forms of investment and low demand by traditional borrowers ha[d] increased the
search for high-yield lending opportunities." Id. at 208 n.3.
2 See Note, supra note 1, at 122-25 (fairness opinion is investment banker's opinion on
deal's value). A fairness opinion is based on the results of an investment banker's analysis of
the financial value of the corporations involved in a particular transaction. Id. at 122. Al-
though the value of a publicly-held company is quantified best by the market price of its
shares, "acquirors have been willing to pay substantial premiums for the shares of target
companies." Id.; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Manage-
ment in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1165-67 (1981) (share price
best represents true value of company under efficient capital market theory). Thus, the pur-
pose of a fairness opinion is "to determine the difference between the market price of a
company's shares and the value of the shares in a transaction where corporate control is
being sold." Note, supra note 1, at 122.
On a technical level, fairness opinions have been severely criticized because the lack of
uniformity in the financial models used by investment bankers in arriving at their estimate
of fair price frequently yield disparate results. See Bebchuk & Kahan, Fairness Opinions:
How Fair are They and What can be Done About It?, 1989 DuKE L.J. 27, 30 (1989) (defin-
ing "fair price" usually leads to significantly different estimates between investment bank-
ers). Even when bankers employ the identical techniques, because they "simplify, assume,
and estimate in different ways that are all reasonable and justifiable, they often arrive at
different estimates of fair price." Id. at 34 (footnotes omitted); see also Note, supra note 1,
at 124 (modern valuation techniques cannot determine with precision fair price).
3 Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 2, at 27. In addition to the increase in the number of
sale of control transactions, courts have directly aided the proliferation of fairness opinions
by declaring such opinions relevant and sometimes even dispositive of whether a director
has fulfilled his fiduciary duty. Id. at 28; see, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d
357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980) (obtaining fairness opinion evidenced good faith); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876-78 (Del. 1985) (directors' failure to obtain fairness opinion sig-
nificant in finding violation of duty of care); Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557,
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an investment banker's fairness opinion is intended to protect
shareholders by presenting an independent, third party assessment
of the financial fairness of a merger or buyout proposal.4 As a re-
sult of the crucial role of investment bankers in the decision-mak-
ing process affecting the financial affairs of shareholders, courts re-
cently have indicated a willingness to extend the liability of
investment bankers to shareholders.5 However, third-party liability
of investment bankers is only an emerging concept 6 and most
courts, finding a lack of contractual privity, have denied direct ac-
tionS7 by shareholders against investment bankers for negligence in
supplying a fairness opinion." Recently, however, in Schneider v.
572, 473 N.E.2d 19, 27, 483 N.Y.S.2d .667, 676 (1984) (dictum indicated retention of invest-
ment bank would be "good means" to demonstrate fair price).
4 See Note, supra note 1, at 120 (fairness opinion is investment banker's judgment of
quality of transaction). An impartial, third-party assessment becomes crucial in a merger or
buyout context because conflicts of interest, arising from the inevitable intertwining of their
personal futures with that of the outcome of the transaction, may influence management. Id.
at 125-26.
See Wells v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 127 A.D.2d 200, 202-03, 514
N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1st Dep't 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 72 N.Y.2d 11, 526 N.E.2d 8, 530
N.Y.S.2d 517 (1988). In Wells, the Appellate Division, First Department, allowed a direct
action against the investment bankers who allegedly were negligent in preparing a fairness
opinion. Id. Among the findings of the court, were that management had retained the bank-
ers solely as a service to the shareholders, and that the bankers were aware the shareholders
would use their opinion. Id. Crucial to the court's determination was the fact that the proxy
materials sent to the shareholders, on the basis of which they approved the buyout, con-
tained the opinion prepared by the bankers. Id. at 201, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 1.
' See Brodsky, Investment Banker Liability to Shareholders, N.Y.L.J., May 3, 1990, at
4, col. 5. One commentator has predicted that third-party liability of investment bankers
would soon become an accepted practice, and proposed that this extension of liability to
shareholders could rest on a theory of either negligent misrepresentation or direct fiduciary
duty. See Note, The Standard of Care Required of an Investment Banker to Minority
Shareholders in a Cash-Out Merger: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 98, 100
(1983).
7 See generally H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 1045-46 (3d ed. 1983)
(distinction between direct and derivative actions). A derivative action is brought on behalf
of a corporation against third parties or corporate fiduciaries, whereas a direct action is
brought on a shareholder's own behalf against the corporation or its fiduciaries. Id. at 1045.
Since a shareholder must show that the act of the wrongdoer injured the corporation, a
derivative action may be unavailable in the sale of control transaction context because the
purchase price runs directly to the shareholders without affecting the corporation. See id. at
1045-46; Brodsky, supra note 6, at 3, col. 1.
8 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1348 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Note, supra note 1, at 128-30. The Weinberger court
found no authority to support the allegation that an investment banker owes a fiduciary
duty to minority shareholders merely because management had retained him. Weinberger,
426 A.2d at 1348.
Although courts have not extended third-party liability to investment banks on a negli-
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Lazard Freres & Co.,9 the Appellate Division, First Department,
held that in the context of a sale involving the control of a corpora-
tion, the relationship between the shareholders and a special com-
mittee of the board of directors was that of principal and agent,
thus placing the bankers in contractual privity with the sharehold-
ers for whose benefit their advice was rendered. 10
In Schneider, former shareholders of RJR Nabisco, Inc.
("RJR") brought a direct action against the investment bankers
retained by the Special Committee" of RJR's Board of Directors
for allegedly giving negligent advice in evaluating competing bids
for the company.' 2 In particular, the shareholders alleged that the
bankers were negligent when they advised the Special Committee
that the final bids were substantially equivalent when, in fact, the
bid from the Management Group was superior.' 3 The bankers
moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion, 4 arguing that their advice was intended for the Special Com-
mittee, not the shareholders. They contended, therefore, that they
owed no duty of care to the shareholders to render non-negligent
advice.'5 The Supreme Court, New York County, denied the mo-
gence theory, they have allowed direct shareholder actions in cases of fraud. See Note,
supra note 1, at 128-30. However, in order to establish liability, the shareholder must prove
scienter, a difficult burden due to a lack of shareholder access or knowledge of the actual
negotiations. Id. at 129.
159 A.D.2d 291, 552 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1st Dep't 1990).
10 Id. at 297, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
" See id. at 292, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 572. The Special Committee was comprised of a group
of disinterested RJR Nabisco, Inc. ("RJR") directors. Id. A "disinterested" committee is
intended to protect the shareholders by reducing the potential for conflicts of interest when
a management group is a participant in the sale of control. See Oesterle & Norberg, supra
note 1, at 242; see also infra note 24 (requirement of disinterestedness for application of
business judgment doctrine). One pair of commentators has expressed a concern that such
committees may actually harm shareholders if the formation of a committee causes a relaxa-
tion of scrutiny by the courts. See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 1, at 242.
12 Schneider, 159 A.D.2d at 292, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 572. The auction of RJR's stock was
conducted between the successful bidder, Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., and a manage-
ment-led group. Id.
'3 Id. The shareholders argued in the alternative that, if the bid from the Management
Group was inferior, the bankers should have advised the Special Committee to request an-
other bid from the Management Group, or, if the bids were financially equivalent as the
bankers claimed, the bankers should have instructed the Special Committee to solicit tie-
breaking bids from both groups. Id.
11 Id. In the alternative, the bankers moved to dismiss the action upon the condition
that they be allowed to intervene in the earlier commenced action in Delaware, or stay the
New York action pending final determination of the Delaware action. Id.
18 Id.
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tion and the defendants appealed.'
In upholding the sufficiency of the complaint,"7 the Appellate
Division, First Department, ruled that the traditional principles of
corporate governance do not apply in a buyout context since the
purpose of the transaction is not to benefit the corporation, but
rather for the protection of the shareholders.' 8 In expanding its
previous ruling in Wells v. Shearson Lehman/American Express,
Inc.,'9 the First Department rejected the bankers' assertion that
privity was lacking, and found that the board of directors had cre-
ated the Special Committee soley to act as the agent of the share-
holders in order to obtain the highest possible price for their
stock. 0 Thus, the court held that the shareholders could bring an
action in negligence against the bankers for advice given to the
Special Committee under established principles of agency, not-
withstanding that the bankers had never directly dealt with the
shareholders.2
Although the Schneider court's extension of third-party liabil-
ity to negligent investment bankers advances desirable policy
objectives,22 the court's utilization of agency theory appears mis-
placed in the corporate setting and seems to promote divergent
standards of professional liability. It is suggested that the stan-
dards applied to other professionals, such as accountants, should
determine the basis of liability for investment bankers.
Traditional corporate law generally has declined to treat direc-
tors as agents of either the corporation or the shareholders.23 More
16 Id. at 291, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
17 See id. The First Department modified the order of the Supreme Court, New York
County, by granting the defendant's motion to stay the New York action pending final de-
termination of the Delaware proceeding. Id.
18 Id. at 297, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
19 127 A.D.2d 200, 203, 514 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1st Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 72 N.Y.2d
11, 526 N.E.2d 8, 530 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1988); see supra, note 5. In Wells, a direct action was
allowed against the investment bankers for negligence in preparing a fairness opinion.
Wells, 127 A.D.2d at 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 2. The investment bankers were hired by a
committee, which was created by the officers of the corporation to determine the fairness of
the buy-out. Id. The court held that "[a]nybody hired by the committee, aiding in its en-
deavor, was actually retained to advise the shareholders." Id.
o Schneider, 159 A.D.2d at 297, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
2' Id. In a traditional agency relationship, a third party is liable for negligent state-
ments made to an agent who relied upon the statements to the detriment of the principal.
See H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 184 (2d ed.
1990).
22 See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
13 See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 611 n.3 (directors are neither agents
1991]
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commonly, the law has viewed the role of directors as that of trust-
ees, who have a fiduciary obligation to discharge their duties with
reasonable care, as measured by the "business judgment rule. '24
This fiduciary duty rests solely with the directors and is not dele-
gable to an investment banker.2 5 No decisional law exists indicat-
ing a change in the role of directors in a buyout or merger context,
and in fact, courts have reaffirmed that the duty remains
unchanged.28
Moreover, it is suggested that the doctrine of agency is facially
nor trustees); see, e.g., New York Dock Co. v. McCollom, 173 Misc. 106, 109, 16 N.Y.S.2d
844, 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939) (director not agent of corporation or stockholders); see also
Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and The Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM.
L. REv. 1403, 1428 (1985) ("contours of the traditional agency relationship do not delineate
the relationship between investors and management of large public corporations"). An
agency exists when a principal appoints an agent, the agent accepts, and the principal has
control over the agent's actions. Id. "[T]he relationship between corporate management and
stockholders does not follow that conventional doctrine." Id.
24 See N.Y. Bus. Corp. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1990). "A director shall
perform his duties ... in good faith and with that degree of care which an ordinarily pru-
dent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances." Id. New York has
interpreted the business judgment rule as:
Bar[ring] judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in good faith...
."[T]heir powers therein are without limitation and free from restraint, and the
exercise of them for the common and general interests of the corporation may not
be questioned, although the results show that what they did was unwise or
inexpedient."
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926
(1979) (quoting Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 207 N.Y. 113, 124, 100 N.E. 721, 724 (1912)); see
also Heimann v. American Express Co., 53 Misc. 2d 749, 763, 279 N.Y.S.2d 867, 881 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1967) (business judgment doctrine insulates acts of directors in absence of "fraud,
bad faith, abuse of power or ulterior motives"); Comment, The Business Judgment Rule
and Anti-Takeover Defensive Tactics: Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 62 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 721, 728-29 (1988) (business judgment rule requires reasonableness standard,
which insulates liability if followed). But see Parkoff v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 53
N.Y.2d 412, 417-18, 425 N.E.2d 820, 822, 442 N.Y.S.2d 432, 434 (1981) (-doctrine should not
be interpreted to stifle legitimate scrutiny by stockholders of decisions of management").
2 See Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. But see In
re The Richmond Corp., 41 S.E.C. 398, 405 (1963) (in dictum, SEC indicated that invest-
ment banker who issues general prospectus may have duty of care to investing public com-
monly required of fiduciaries (citing H. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1933))).
2 See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989). In the
context of a sale of control transaction, the directors must meet the "requirement of fairness
for the purpose of enhancing general shareholder interests . . . [and] the board's primary
objective, and essential purpose, must remain the enhancement of the bidding process for
the benefit of the stockholders." Id. at 1286-87. Although the Mills court recognized an
enhanced duty requirement of directors in the sale of control context, the court also noted
that the nature of their relationship with the shareholders does not change. See id. at 1287
(discussing enhanced duty requirement set out in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)).
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inapplicable to the facts of Schneider. Although the characteriza-
tion of a director as a fiduciary does not preclude the existence of
an agency,27 the functional relationship between directors and
shareholders warrants against such a portrayal. 28 An agency rela-
tionship implies control by the shareholders over the acts and deci-
sions of the Special Committee, which the court contradicted with
its finding that the shareholders "were not to do anything other
than passively follow the recommendation of the Special Commit-
tee. '29 It also appears doubtful that the shareholders would be
held personally liable to third parties for contracts entered into by
the Special Committee as would a principal in a true agency
relationship.3
Despite the theoretical weaknesses of the Schneider court's re-
liance on an agency relationship, the extension of third-party lia-
bility to investment bankers in a sale-of-control transaction is a
desirable result, which garners support from various policy consid-
erations."' For example, the prevalence of contingent fee
arrangements and the intimate business relationship between
217 See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 700-
703 (1982). Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have stated that fiduciary principles govern
agency relationships and that the entire structure of a corporation is itself a series of agency
relationships. Id. at 700. Although a description of corporate relationships as a series of
agencies may facilitate the theoretical delegation of authority from the investors to the di-
rectors, the characterization becomes attenuated when extended to impose third-party lia-
bility to those contracting with directors. See Brudney, supra note 23, at 1427-28. In at-
tempting to apply agency theory to corporate relationships, the analysis "focuses more on
th[e] commonalities than on the differences," resulting in a flawed conception that "norma-
tive consequences appropriate for one such relationship are appropriate for others in totally
different contexts." Id. at 1428.
2' See Brudney, supra note 23, at 1428-30 (relationship between corporate management
and shareholders does not follow conventional doctrine of agency).
20 Schneider, 159 A.D.2d at 296, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 574. An agency is a consensual rela-
tionship in which the agent acts on behalf of the principal and is subject to the control of
the principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) [hereinafter RESTATEMiENT]; see
also Brudney, supra note 23, at 1429 (characterization as agency imports concepts of control
by investors over management activities and actual consent to what management does).
"0 See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 26 (principal liable to third party as
result of act of principal's agent); Wachtell, Roth & Houston, Investment Banker Liability
to Shareholders in the Sale-of-Control Context, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 29, 1990, at 4, col. 5 (in
criticizing Schneider, authors queried whether "the shareholders, as 'principals,' [are] to be
deemed personally liable for any 'torts' committed by their 'agents' in the conduct of an
auction").
31 See generally Note, supra note 6, at 110-11 (not extending liability allows directors
to fulfill their duty with lower standard of care as long as they obtain banker's opinion);
Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 1, at 249-50 (misuse of fairness opinions is weak link in
protecting shareholders).
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bankers and directors have raised serious questions as to the im-
partiality of fairness opinions.32 In addition, if investment bankers
remain insulated from liability, the shareholders may be without
an adequate remedy in the buyout context since courts typically
construe the "business judgment rule" to protect directors when
they have sought and obtained an investment banker's advice.3 3 Fi-
nally, the argument has been made that extending the .liability of
investment bankers, would force the entire profession to become
more standardized and demonstrate greater competence, as has oc-
curred in the accounting field.3 4
It is proposed that investment bankers be subject to the same
standard of liability as are other professionals. New York has ex-
tended the liability of a negligent accountant to non-contractual
third parties who were the known and intended beneficiaries of the
accountant's contractual performance. 5 Applying such a standard
32 See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 2, at 37-45. Although a banker's fee for preparing
a fairness opinion is often fixed, a banker is frequently involved in other aspects of the deal
for which substantial fees are contingent on the consummation of the transaction and the
eventual price obtained, thus creating substantial incentives to characterize proposals or
bids to further their own pecuniary interests. Id. at 38-39; see also Anderson v. Boothe, 103
F.R.D. 430, 436 (D. Minn. 1984) (contingent fees may bias fairness opinion). In addition to
fees, a banker's objectivity is questionable since he frequently knows the directors that hire
him and usually has an ongoing business relationship that he is inclined to protect by favor-
ing the interests of management over those of shareholders. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note
2, at 42-43. The argument also has been posed that a bank's interest in protecting its profes-
sional reputation promotes unbiased opinions. See id. at 43. However, courts have not dis-
tinguished fairness opinions on the trustworthiness of a specific bank and shareholders gen-
erally do not have detailed information on the quality of a bank's opinion other than the
general reputation of the investment bank. See id. at 43-44; Note, supra note 1, at 127-28.
3' See supra note 23 (director not liable as agent and therefore only liable to corpora-
tion if business judgment rule violated). In Schneider, a derivative action would have been
unavailable to the shareholders since the court expressly stated that the injury, if any, was
sustained by the shareholders and not the corporation. Schneider, 159 A.D.2d at 297, 552
N.Y.S.2d at 575; see also Fifty States Management Corp. v..Niagara Permanent Say. and
Loan Ass'n, 58 A.D.2d 177, 179, 396 N.Y.S.2d 925, 927 (4th Dep't 1977) (shareholder has no
separate right of action apart from right of corporation); supra note 7 (distinction between
direct and derivative suits).
31 See generally Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third Parties,
52 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 838, 855-56 (1977) (increased reliance upon and central role of
accountants require clearer standard of liability which will enhance and strengthen profes-
sion); Note, supra note 1, at 137 ("accountants have responded to increased legal liability by
improving their standards and techniques").
31 See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 551, 483 N.E.2d
110, 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 443 (1985). The Credit Alliance court established that, in New
York, the criteria for extending third-party liability to a negligent accountant requires reli-
ance by a third party and some conduct on the part of the accountant that links the ac-
countant to that party. Id. The court rejected the broader standard applied by other juris-
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to investment bankers would hold them directly liable to share-
holders in the buyout context, given that the shareholders are the
primary beneficiaries of their fairness opinions.36 The standard es-
tablished by the First Department in Schneider, however, imposes
liability regardless of whether the bankers knew that the share-
holders would potentially rely on their advice. On the other hand,
use of a more traditional framework of third party liability, that
does not improperly superimpose agency theory on a corporate re-
lationship, furthers the policy considerations favoring the exten-
sion of liability without unreasonably expanding the scope of an
investment banker's liability.
John J. Kim
Defense barred under New York State Constitution from racially
discriminating through exercise of peremptory challenges
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 270.25 affords both
prosecutors and criminal defendants the right to exercise per-
dictions, derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 552 (1965), which permits
recovery by any foreseeable plaintiff. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 553, 483 N.E.2d at 119,
493 N.Y.S.2d at 444; see, e.g., Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 904,
451 A.2d 1308, 1312 (1982) (accountant liable to all foreseeable plaqutiffs); Blue Bell, Inc. v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Tex. App. Dallas 1986) (foreseeability
expanded to all parties accountant "knew, or should have known" would receive
information).
The general trend in accountant liability seems to be moving toward a more expansive
basis of liability and away from the previous rule that an accountant could not be liable for
mere negligence to a non-contractual party. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170,
189, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931). In Ultramares, Judge Cardozo expressed the concern that
holding accountants liable to third parties for mere negligence would "expose accountants to
a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."
Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. The realities of the accountant's increasingly vital role has,
however, led many courts to recognize the need for an enhanced degree of legal responsibil-
ity. See Mess, supra note 34, at 855.
"8 See Note, supra note 1, at 136 n.93; Wells, 127 A.D.2d at 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
In Wells, the court held that the investment bankers were liable to the stockholders for
their negligent preparation of a fairness opinion because they must have been aware of the
stockholders' reliance on their opinion. Id.
37 See Schneider, 159 A.D.2d at 296, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 574. In Schneider, the sharehold-
ers never alleged reliance, nor any claim that the investment bankers' advice was passed on
or was intended to be passed on to the shareholders. Id. It is submitted, therefore, that
investment bankers should not be subject to an unlimited scope of liability, but should,
however, be accountable for damages caused by their negligent advice if the injured party
was a foreseeable one.
